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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This cas0 involves a lawsuit instituted by plaintiffs-
''l'f'"l 1ants l"AppP11ants") in November of 1980 to collect from 
dPfPnclants-respondents ("RPspondents") certain damages incurred 
duP to Rpspondcnts' alleged failure to perform the obligations of 
an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase and related letter 
agrePment between Appellants as the designated sellers and 
Respondents as the designated purchasers of certain real property 
situated in Wasatch County, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The matter came on for trial before a jury and the 
Honorable ,Jay E. Banks, District Judge, on June 28, 1982. The 
iury entered a special verdict in the case and the trial court 
subsequently awarded a no cause cf action judgment against 
Appellants and in favor of Respondents on July 15, 1982 (R. 622) 
The trial court took under advisement the issue of an award of 
attorneys fees to Respondents. Later, on January 17, 1983, the 
trial court entered a judgment providing that Respondents recover 
attorney's fees and costs from Appellants in the total amount of 
$24,877.00 (R. 714). 
RELIEF S0l1GHT 0N APPFi'f 
court's January 17, 1983 iudqment which awardPrl attnrne\" 
Respondents. 
STATEMENT OF THE FArTS 
A. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE. 
The sole issue on appeal concerns attorneys fpes and '" 
a question of law to be determined by a review of tha 
pleadings, certain trial proceedinqs, and the spPcific contract1 
language at issue. However, capsule summary of the facts nf 
principal lawsuit is helpful for proper understandina of tha icr 
to be decided. 
1. Appellants owned a ranch in Wasatch rountv, 
consisting of more than 900 acres (the "Property"). In ,Ju 1 v o'. 
1977, Appellants entered into an Earnest Money Receipt and nff 0 r 
to Purchase (the "Purchase Agreement") with Respondents, 
to which Appellants were to have sold the Propertv to Respnnrlert• 
The Purchase Agreement was in the form of a standard, printed 
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase suhiect to 
additional typewritten clauses prepared by Respondents. 
Appellants subsequently clarified anrl amended some of th0 clar1'•' 
in a typewritten document entitled "ProposPrl Amenrlments to th 0 
Offer on Quealy Property," which amenrlments wrre aqrp0d tot,,, 11 
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p,ir t ir>c- and at tilcherl as pages 3-5 of the Purchase Agreement 
ThP following conditions precedent to the Purchase 
/\<Jl Pr>ment became the focal issues of the suhsequent lawsuit 
hPtween the parties: 
52.j. This offer is made subject to the 
following conditions heina satisfied by purchaser 
within 60 days from date of acceptance of this 
offer: 
1. Assurance of an adequate culinary and 
irrigation water system to meet the needs of 
resirlr>ntial d0velopment of the property. 
2. Assurance of proper zoning to develop 
the property into residential lots. 
52.j.2. The "assurance" of proper zoning shall 
mean a preliminary indication by the Wasatch 
County officers regarding zoning. The offer will 
not be sub1ect to the final determination of the 
county of a zoning change. 
Pages 2 and 3 of Exhibit 2-P. 
2. Respondents decided that a water well should be 
drilled in order to satisfy the first condition precedent: 
culinary water availability. Much time was consumed by 
Respondents in determining what to do ahout that matter. After 
negotiations and just prior to the scheduled closing date of the 
Purchase Agreement, the parties executed a letter agreement lthe 
"Extension Agreement") which extended the closing date in 
consideration of the additional time needed hy Respondents and a 
firm commitment to drill a test well on conditions stated therein 
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(Exhibit 3-P). 
contract (the "Agreements") between the partir,s. 
3. At this point the fartual contentions of th» p, 
diverge concerning what kind of well Respondents wc>rP nr' ici1" 
to drill and whether Respondents met their drillino ohliq0tinc, 
under the terms of the Agreements. For purposes of this arnc-' 
however, it suffices to say that Respondents hired Gardner 
Drilling Company to drill the well, some drilling activitv 
occurred, the well caved in, and it was ahandoned without 
completion or test pumping. 
4. Later, in May of 1978, Appellants' attornPV r0c";, 
a letter from Respondents' attorney (Exhibit 27-P) which pr•Y•de' 
in relevant part as follows: 
1. Equity [Respondents] has made a real 
effort to ohtain a well on the Ouealy propertv 
which has, as you might have heard, resulted in 
another cave-in and unusable well. The Andersnn° 
have expended substantially in excess nf 
$50,000.00 on this effort but have not heen ahle 
to bring in a producing water well. 
2. Bruce Anderson has become i 11 and has 
had to be operated on and will have to spend some 
time recuperating. This, toaether with Gary's 
current condition, has now placed real strain on 
their abilities and efforts at development. 
For the foreaoinq reasons, the Andersons 
feel that they must ahandon the 0uealy projert 
for purchase of the balance of the property and 
retain only the 29 acres prevint1°.ly purchaser1. 
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In arlrlit1on, there is a $5,000.00 Earnest 
D0po' it with Menrlenhal l Brothers which 
vhnulrl he refunrl<:>rl since the conditions of the 
earnest monPy aareement have not come to pass. 
A copy of this letter to Mendenhall Brothers 
will constitute our request that these funris be 
forthwith returned to Equity Homes.I 
Appellants later instituterl this lawsuit to recover 
damages, after sel 1 ina the Property to other parties at a lower 
price than Responrlents had offered. The $5,000.00 earnest money 
deposit was, in the meantime, returned to Responrients by the 
real tors without the express con8ent of Appellants. 
R. OPERATIVE FACTS. 
The operative facts for determination of the sole issue on 
this appeal consist of the contents of the documents alreariy 
inentified ahove and the following additional facts. 
1. Responrlents based their claim for attorneys fees in 
the trial court solely upon the following provision of the printed 
portion of the Purchase Aareement: 
lThe only exhihits relevant to this appeal concerning 
attorneys fees are Exhihits 2-P, 3-P anrl to a lesser extent, 27-P, 
all of which are qunterl in this hrief. Notwithstanriing a rather 
11miterl d0signation of recorrl on appeal, the clerk below incluried 
in the record all of the exhibits anrl all of the pleadings, most 
of which are not necessary for review for the limited issues to he 
<J, t0rm1nerl on this appeal. ThP Court should not he burdened, 
thPrefor0, hy the non-relevant exhihits and/or pleadings not 
ref0rred to in the hr1efs of the parties. 
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We do hereby aqree to carrv rn1t CJn<l f,11f1 ! 
the terms and conditions specified at 
[relating to .sale of the Prnf0 0rtyl, and thP 
Seller agrees to furnish goori anl markr>tciblP 
title with a policy of title insurancr in thn 
name of the purchaser and to make final 
conveyance by warranty deed . Tf either 
party fails so to do, he aqrees to all 
expenses of enforcing this aqreement, or of 
any right arisina out of the breCJrh thereof, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
Lines 45 - 48 of page l, Exhibit 2-P. 
2. Throughout the course of the case, beqinnina wit·· 
Respondents' Answer and concludina with the proposed and artu 
jury instructions, argument, and proposed and actual 
verdict, Respondents consistently sought to prove that thP 
Purchase Agreement was ( l) void from its inception; ( 2\ vaauc, 
uncertain and unenforceable; ( 3) not sianeo by al 1 of th0 nM··'·-' 
parties; (4) later replaced by an accord and satisfaction 
the parties; and.lor (5) later rescinded or abandoned by mllt11ci 1 
agreement of the parties, thereby relieving Responoents from 
liability for damages to Appellants based upon the Purchase 
Agreement. 
3. Respondents' intensive and persistent attempts tn 
void the Purchase Agreement were rewarded. 
that was finally submitted to the jury in this case 
upon three basic issues: whether or not the condition prer0!•r' 
to the Purchase Agreement of appropriate zon i no was m<:'t, wret 1 , 
or not the condition precedent to the Agrnement nf 
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•t:l11nr\' \>J,lt•r c,urrlic-s was mC't, and whether the claims 
f,I'f'PI Lints wPrP the suhiect of a s0ttlement and accord 
4. In renclror ing the Special VPrdict (R. 556) the iury 
found for Appellants on the issue of Responclents' failure to 
fulfil 1 the condition precedent on thP water well (paragraph 3) 
and also found that Appellants would have been entitled to 
$250, 000 damaqps (paragraph S). However, the Respondents 
eventually prevailed and succeeded in avoiding the Purchase 
AgreemPnt and any damaqes due to Appellants for failure to perform 
thereunder by establishing to the satisfaction of the iurv in 
rendering the Special Verdict (and the trial court in reaching its 
legal conclusions therefrom) that: ( l) a con cl it ion precedent to 
performance under the Purchase Agreement relating to County 
approval was never met, and therefore the Purchase Agreement was 
never an enforc0ablP contract (paragraph 2); and (2) even if the 
Purchase AarPement were at one time an enforceable contract 
hetwPen the parties, it was later replaced hy a settlement and 
accord t.c.t"c•·n tr.<0 parties (paragraph 41. 
S. AftPr successfully avoiding liability to Appellants 
in the manner just described, with typical incongruence 
Respondents ahrnaat0d their theories of nonliability and claimed 
that the Purchao-e Agreement "'as indeed in existence and 
•·nfnrc•0 ar·lP for thP l im1 ted purpose of col lectinq their attorneys 
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fees. (See Attorney Fee:", rn. l-ci, 11n"- CJ-I 
R. 734) • The trial judge, incorrertlv, hni1nht th•· pin\'. 
ARGUMENT 
A. RESPONDENTS SHOULD BE DENIED RECOVERY OF ATTORNEYS FEFS 
WHETHER OR NOT A BINDING CONTRACT EXISTED. 
(1) Respondents Are Estoppea from Recnverinq Attornevs fpnr 
Based Upon Language In A Contract Which Thev Succeccf,1'' 
Established Did Not Exist Between the Parties. 
Throughout the case, Respondents based their theories n' 
nonliability upon the position that the ohl igations of the parti' 
pursuant to the terms of the Purchase and Extension Aqreementc 
never came into existence because (l) the Purchase Agreement ,,ac 
void at inception; (2) the Agreements were too vaque ann uncert; 
to constitute a final and enforceahle contract hetween the 
parties; (3) the Agreements were never signed hy Peter P. K Nn Jr· 
Wing Jun Ng (the "Ngs") and were therefore voin pursuant to 11t;i>' 
Statute of Frauds; (4) the conditions precedent to any ohl iaat1cr 
to perform the Agreements were never met; and/or (5) if a h1nc11nn 
purchase contract ever existed, it was later rescinded hv mutu•' 
agreement or replaced with a new contract created hy an accorrl 
settlement between the parties. 
The followinq l i 00 t chronologically cataloques some nl ' 
defenses raised or interpretations asserted by Responnents n11r · 
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tf1•' co11rc• nf litiqation, which bear on Respondents' claimed right 
''" p·c••VPr attorneys fees even when the contract did not exist. 
Emphasis has hern addPd by Appellants: 
a. "The terms of the documents . . did 
not create or reflect a meeting of the 
an enforceable 
contractual relationship between plaintiffs and 
defendants. (Sixth Defense of 
Respondents' Answer, R. 22). 
b. "[Tl he documents . . are void because 
not suhscribed by the plaintiffs NG . 
(Eighth Defense of Respondents' Answer, R. 23). 
c. "Any contractual relationship created or 
reflected by the documents . • was rescinded or 
abandoned by the mutual agreement of plaintiffs 
and defendants. " (Tenth Defense of 
Respondents' Answer, R. 23). 
d. "Plaintiffs and defendants have reached 
a settlement and accord, as evidenced by, among 
pla1nt1ffs' return to defendants of 
the $5,000 deposit. (Eleventh Defense of 
Respondents' Answer, R. 23). 
e. "Any contractual obligation of 
defendants to purchase the subject property was 
excused by the inability of defendants to locate 
adequate supplies of . . water . . and by 
the inability to secure proper zoning. 
(Fourteenth Defense of Respondents' Answer, 
R. 2 4) • 
f. "Exhibits 'A' and 'B' to plaintiffs' 
Complaint are copies of the alleged written 
contracts of the parties." (Page 6 of Memorandum 
in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, R. 99). 
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g. "Presumably, at that p0int, t'H' 
condition precedent not havi nq r•PPn 
defendants have the right 
Earnest ancl Offer to_l_'_':'._r:_c::_t-i_ase." 
(Page 9 of Memorandum in Support of Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 102). 
h. "In conclusion, defendants submit that, 
pursuant to the express language of the Utah 
Statute of Frauds, and to Utah Supreme Court 
decisions interpreting that language, the 
agreements of the parties are void and 
unenforceable." (Page 8 of Respondents' 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Directed 
Verdict, R. 462). 
i. "However, a preliminary indication on 
zoning approval was never obtained. Consequently 
defendants' obligation to perform the amendecl 
earnest money agreement never came into 
existence." (Page 9 of Respondents' Memorandum 
in Support of Motion for Directed Verdict, 
R. 463). 
j. "'An accord and satisfaction is a method 
of discharging a contract, or settling a claim 
arising from a contract, by substituting for 
such contract or claim an agreement for the 
satisfaction thereof and the execution of the 
substituted agreement.'" (Page 10 of 
Respondents' Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Directed Verdict, R. 464). 
k. "[T]he parties and plaintiff QUEALY's 
counsel believed the agreements were merely 
preliminary to final agreement on all terms." 
(Respondents' Trial Brief at page 2, R. 661). 
1. "The Earnest Money and the Proposed 
Amendments further conditioned the effectiveness 
of the agreements on assurance of proper zoninq." 
(Defendants' Trial Brief at page 5, R. 664). 
m. "Plaintiff at no time inoicatecl an 
intention to enforce the Earnest 
occurrence of the conditTOn-precedents and never 
made any demand upon defendants for performance 
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nf th" parties' agreement. Accordingly, 
plaintiffs' agent returned to defendants their 
earnPst money deposit." (Defendants' Trial Brief 
at paqe 6, R. 665). 
n. "Almost two years after the transactions 
with nefendants had terminated, plaintiffs filed 
the instant action." (Defendants' Trial Brief at 
page 7, R. 666). 
o. "You are further instructed that the law 
of this state renders void any agreement for the 
sale of an interest in real property unless the 
sale is evidenced by a written document that is 
signed by all of the selling parties. 
(Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions at page 
19, R. 489, not given by the trial court) .2 
p. "If the condition precedent is not 
fulfilled, or the fact or event does not exist or 
occur, the right to enforce the contract does not 
arise." (Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions 
at page 22, R. 492, given as Instruction No. 18, 
R. 54 0) • 
q. "A settlement and accord is a method 
of discharging a contract • by substituting 
" (Defendants' Proposed 
Jury Instructions at page 34, R. 504, given as 
Instruction No. 21, R. 543). 
r. "The parties to a contract may agree to 
rescind, i.e., abandon the contract by relieving 
the contractual liability of either party." 
(Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions at page 
3'i, R. SOS, not given). 
2sy making references to jury instructions, whether or 
not given, Appellants do not quarrel with the trial court's 
instructions to the jury on seeking any review thereof by this 
\ourt; rather, Appellants are demonstrating the inconsistent 
manner in which Respondents alternately claim relief for attorneys 
fees through avoiding and/or establishing a contract. 
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s. "Were the claims assPrtec1 r,v plaintiff 
Jay A. Quealy, Jr. in this lawsllit th» sur i0r> 
of a settlement and accnrc1 with 
(Special Verdict, as initiated hy Responc1ents 
at paragraph 10, R. 467, and answered hy the 
jury, paragraph 4 of Special Verni ct, R. c,•,()). 
Two of the theories asserted by Respondents during 
course of the trial--accord and satisfaction ann failure of a 
condition precedent to the Agreements--ultimately prevailPn whPn 
the jury returned the Special Verdict and the trial court ent0r•! 
judgment based thereon. Having successfully establishen that 
Respondents were released from all of the obligations of the 
Agreements, Respondents substantively reversed their position 31< 
asserted that the printed obligations in the Purchase Aqreemen> 
were indeed applicable insofar as they would support an awarn nf 
attorneys' fees to Respondents. 
The clause that Respondents relied upon for atto!nevs' 
fees is contained in the basic printed terms of the Purchase 
Agreement, and reads as follows: 
We do hereby agree to carry out and fulfill 
the terms and conditions specified above [basic 
terms of sale and purchase], and the seller 
agrees to furnish good and marketable title with 
a policy of title insurance in the name of the 
purchaser and to make final conveyance by 
warranty deed. If either party fails so tn 
do, he agrees to pay all expenses of enforcing 
this agreement, or of any right arising out of 
the breach thereof, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee. 
Lines 45-48 of the Purchase Agreement, Exhibit 2-P. 
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Appellants will later demonstrate, the clear 
,-,iritractual terms of the above clause did not entitle Respondents 
to an award of attorneys fees. More importantly, however, 
Respondents are estopped from relying upon the clause, regardless 
of its content, because the clause is part of a Purchase Agreement 
which Respondents successfully established was not in legal 
existence at the time of trial. Respondents cannot be allowed to 
capitalize on certain theories in order to prevail on the merits 
and then reverse those theories in order to recover attorneys' 
fees. 
B. L. T. Investment Company v. Snow, 586 P.2d 456 (Utah 
1978), is a controlling decision and represents the law of Utah 
applicable to this case. The defendant Snow, as seller of a 
ranch, and the plaintiffs, as buyers, executed a written contract 
in which specific provisions relating to the establishment of an 
escrow account which would protect Snow were largely absent. When 
a satisfactory escrow agreement which would protect Snow was not 
reachPd, he refused to execute and deliver deeds to the property, 
which precipitated the lawsuit. At trial, Snow sought rescission 
of the purchase agreement, and contended that a satisfactory 
escrow arrangement was a condition precedent to the purchase 
agreement. He claimed that since a satisfactory escrow 
arrangement had never been reached, the terms of the purchase 
contract were not binding. The trial court agreed with Snow, 
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fees based upon a clause in the aqr00m0nt. 
The Utah Supreme Court uphelrl the rescission of th0 
purchase agreement but concluded the trial court harl 
committed reversible error in awardinq attorneys' fees to Snow 
based upon the purchase contract. This Court supported its 
decision to deny attorneys' fees to Snow with a quote from 
Bodenhammer v. Patterson, 'i63 P.2d 1212 !Ore. l'l77): 
Finally, Pattersons contend that the trial 
court erred in denying their reauest for 
attorneys' fees. This was not error. Their 
claim for attorneys' fees is based upon a 
provision in the contract of sale. Bv askinq for 
rescission of the contract, they disaffirmed it 
in its entirety. They may not avoid the contract 
and, at the same time, claim the henefit of the 
provision for att_orneys' fees. (Emphasis added). 
586 P.2d at 458. 
It is clear that Respondents are seeking the same 
benefits that the Utah Supreme Court disallowed in Snow. The 
Respondents attempted to avoid the contract at every turn in tr•• 
court, succeeded in doing so, and then claimed the benefits of a 
provision in the successfully avoided contract. This Court cannr• 
countenance the attempts of Respondents to pick anrl choose 
arbitrarily and at will the benefits and/or disadvantaqes of 
the Purchase Agreement. In contrast to Responrlents' tactics, 
Appellants tried to show that the conditions precedent were 
fulfilled and that the Agreements were enforcnahle, hut lost nn 
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the far-ts p1Jtsucint to the Jury's decision on three of the five 
c,pr,c:ial ""'rrlic:t interrogatories. Appellants do not incongruently 
pick and choose terms, hut rely on the applicable contract 
terms as clearly written. 
Respondents ultimately prevailed on the theories of 
(1) failure to satisfy a condition precedent and (2) accord and 
satisfaction. A condition precedent is something that must happen 
or be performed hefore the main contract is enforceable. Without 
the performance of the condition precedent, the main contract, 
although executed and delivered by the parties, cannot be 
enforced. Barbara Oil Company v. Patrick Petroleum Company, 566 
P.2d 389, 392 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977); Sweet v. Stormont Vail 
Regional Medical Center, 647 P. 2d 1274, 1280 (Kan. 1982). A 
condition precedent calls for the performance of some act or 
happening of some event after the contract is executed, without 
which the obligations of the contract in main do not exist. 
Meacham v. Oklahoma Bank and Trust Company, 600 P.2d 868, 870 
(Okla. 1979). 
In Haraka v. Datry, 252 S.E. 2d 71 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979), 
the court stated that evidence of a condition precedent "goes to 
the very existence of the contract and tends to show that no valid 
and effective contract ever existed, at least not until the 
fulfillment of the condition." Id. at 72. Similarly, in Hicks v. 
Bush, 180 N.E. 2d 425 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1962), the court stated that 
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"[a]s the courts below found, thP r;ntiP:0 <l1cl nnt rnnt•mr>Ld• 
performance of the writtPn aqreemPnt until fcPrta1nl f1rnrir '"' 
first received. In other words . the writina was nnt tn 
become operative as a contract . . until lthP mnn0yl wa.c; 
raised." Id. at 428. 
The above theories of condition precPrlPnt wPrP, in 
substance, put forward by Respondents during the course nf thP 
trial through arguments which include the following: 
"However, a preliminary indication of zoninq 
approval was never obtained. ConsPquently, 
defendants' obligation to perform the amended 
earnest money agreement never came into 
existence." (Respondents' Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Directed Verdict at page g, R. 4h31 
"If the condition precedent is not fulfilled, or 
the fact or event does not exist or occur, the 
right to enforce the contract does not arisP." 
(Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions at 
page 22, R. 492, given as Instruction No. Jfl, 
R. 54 0) • 
"The Earnest Money and the Proposed Amendments 
further conditioned the effectivenPss of the 
agreements on assurance of proper zoning." 
(Respondents' Trial Brief at page 5, R. fdi4\. 
In addition to successfully convincinq thP iury, with 1» 
consequent legal by the trial court, that the 
obligations of the Purchase Agreement never came into Pxic;tPnCP, 
Respondents also successfully asserted that if PurchasP 
Agreement ever existed, it was Jat0r rerlacPd hv an aqrePm0nt 
between the parties knnwn legally as an "accnrd and saticfart11" 
- Hi-
Th" ()f accnrrl and satisfaction is a substitution of a new 
(>r-itract- tor a rrevinus contract. Fairchild v. Mathews, 415 P.2d 
43, 46-47 (Idaho 1966). It is a method of discharging a previous 
contract .!_l::i. toto hy substituting for such contract an agreement 
for the satisfaction thereof and the subsequent execution of such 
a substituted agreement. Smith Construction Company v. Knights of 
Columbus, 519 P.2d 286, 288 (N.M. 1974). The old agreement is 
substituted by a new agreement. The new contract is controlling 
and totally replaces the old one. Cannon v. Stevens School of 
Business, Inc., 560 P. 2d 1383, 1386 (Utah 1977), Plywood Marketing 
Associates v. Astoria Plywood Corporation, 5S8 P.2d 283, 289 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1976), Clark Leasing Corporation v. White Sands 
Forest Products, Inc., 535 P. 2d 1077, 1079 (N.M. 1975). See also -- ---
Williams v. Leathern, 637 P.2d 1296, 1298 (Ore. Ct. App. 1981), and 
United American Life Insurance Company v. Zions First National 
Bank, 641 P.2d 158, 160 (Utah 1982). 
Respondents also staunchly supported the substance of the 
discharge through accord theory of defense throughout the trial, 
as reflected by: 
You are instructed that the parties to a 
contract may mutually terminate their contractual 
obligations and resolve any claims resulting from 
those obligations by a settlement and accord. A 
settlement and accord is a method of discharging 
a contract or settling a claim arising from a 
contract by substituting another agreement that 
satisfies that contract or claim and by 
performing the substitute aareement. 
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(Respondents' Proposed Jury Instructions cit paqe 14, P. 504, ,,, 
as Instruction No. 21, R. 543). 
In summary, Respondents prevailed on the merits in lnwcr 
court with the theories (1) a condition prec<"dent to the opercit1•" 
of the Purchase Agreement never came into existence ann, in th0 
alternative, (2) if the Purchase Aareement was ever operativP, i• 
was later replaced by another contract between the parties hy th• 
legal operation of an accord and satisfaction. Respondents chn°• 
the theories upon which they ultimately prevailed and are estnpr• 
from denying those theories for the purpose of recovering 
attorneys fees based on language of a nonexistent contract. Th• 
Utah case of BLT Investment Company v. Snow, supra, is control 1 i"' 
(2) If a Contract Had Existed Respondents Would he Bound to 
Their Detriment by the Contract Terms Which Thev Propn5•' 
The award of attorneys fees here at issue cannot he 
affirmed irrespective of which horn of Respondents' dilemma the 
may choose to sit on. If no effective contract existed then 
Respondents cannot rely on the contractual languaqe for support, 
as argued under (1) above. If a contract existed they are hounrl 
by the very printed contractual language which they proposed to 
Appellants. As argued subsequently in Point B, the l anquaqe 
not support an award of attorneys fees to Respondents. 
Respondents simply cannot iustify relief either way. This rnur' 
on appeal is not required to determine whether or not a hindino 
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,nntr;H·t Px1stPd between the parties, but is called upon to 
reversP the att0rne;s fee judgment by concluding that Respondents 
should not have been permitted to recover such fees under any 
theory. Aside from the controlling and/or persuasive legal 
precedents cited herein, some rational approaches involving 
applicable philosophical concepts and fairness considerations are 
in order. 
Respondents initiated the offer to Appellants on a 
printed form of Earnest Money Receipt which they selected (Exhibit 
2-P). Many of the standard terms were amended by Respondents to 
suit their particular desires in the transaction, but lines 45-48 
containing the disputed language were not amended. 
In Johnson Tire Service, Inc. v. Thorn, Inc., 613 P.2d 
521 (Utah 1980), this Court affirmed a judgment which had denied 
an award of attorneys fees as part of a judgment for the sale of 
goods. The prevailing plaintiff thus received contractual 
damages, but not attorneys fees. The "contract" for attorneys 
fees was claimed to exist through certain invoices sent by the 
seller but in the fine print added during the course of dealing. 
Although the buyer did not expressly object to the fine print 
during the course of dealing, this Court held that the contract 
terms were not set according to the seller's view of the import of 
the fine print: 
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The addition of a provision for attnrrir•\'r,' frr 
alters the offer mate-rial ly and thw· ,i,,,.,, nnt 
fall within the "additional or differnnt 
Which the StatUtP renders arceptah]P hy ffiPrP 
silence on the part of the 0fferor. \\'P thernfore 
hold that the contract in the stant case 
formed on the defenclant's (offeror'sl terms and 
not plaintiff's (seller's) insofar as the 
attorneys' fees issue is concerned. 
* * * 
In the ahsence of a valid contractual or 
statutory provision therefor, the trial court 
did not err in refusing to make an award of 
attorneys' :'ees. 
613 P.2d at 523. 
In like manner, Respondents here (offeror) formed the 
contract on their terms, which terms do not permit attornevs 
unless enforcement is sought against the defaulting seller, 
is not the case in the ahsence of a counterclaim or other 
affirmative pleading. 
Tt is the very nature of an earnest money receipt and 
offer to purchase that the huyer-offeror states the terms 
initially. If Respondents had wished to assure themselves of 
recovery of attorneys fees in the event they refused to perform 
for whatever reason, were sued and then prevailed, they would ha· 
made the language clear in the manner they amended other lanau 0 oe 
to their intended henefit. But no, it was to their interest tn 
leave the language as it was, assuming that if Appellants as 
sellers failed to perform, then Responnents rould sue and enfn,, 
the agreement against Appellants. 
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Moreover, Respondents had the burden of fulfilling the 
conditions precr"cl"nt to their purchase obligations. They 
knowingly assumed the of their own performance and possible 
litigation relating to enforcement if they chose not to perform. 
Had Respondents wanted assurance of recovering attorneys fees in 
the event of a dispute they would have initiated contractual 
language to cover their position of risk. Appellants, as sellers, 
required some amendments to the Earnest Money Receipt before 
executing it as a contract (pages 3-'i of Exhibit 2-P), but had no 
need to change the language on attorneys fees because they knew 
such fees could be recovered if they chose to enforce the buyer's 
obligations and were to recover. Furthermore, Appellants were 
I ready to fulfill their obligations upon buyers' performance and 
did not have to assume any burdens of fulfillment of conditions 
precedent or risk of their own performance. This differential in 
the respective positions of the parties is important in 
considering the basic philosophical and ethical reasons why it is 
fair to deny Respondents their attorneys fees even though they 
were involuntarily made defendants in the lawsuit. The buyer who 
proposes the deal, initiates the contract and assumes the risk of 
fulfilling the conditions precedent, is more in control of the 
transaction from inception to the time for performance (or the 
choice of nonperformance). In the event of voluntary 
non-performance of buyer, there would be no need from the buyer's 
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own perspective to have the protection snuqht in tl1r cnntrcwt 
the non-defaulting seller. Moreover, it is a WP]] accPpt0rl r1' 
of business and of living qeneral ly that attorneys fePs may h0·'· 
to be incurred, and the courts of this State ann this nation h2v• 
never sustained a broad right of prevailing defendants tn recov•• 
attorneys fees. Accordingly, it is a just and proper 1unicial 
policy that would deny attorneys fees to such parti10>s (ResponnPn'· 
here) in the absence of a clear statutory or contractual mandat•. 
See Johnson Tire Service, Inc., supra, 613 P.2d at 523. 
B. THE TERMS OF THE OPERATIVE CLAUSE DO NOT ALLOW RESPONOFNTS 
TO RECOVER ATTORNEYS FEES IN THIS CASE. 
Again, for the Court's convenienr· 
of the Purchase Agreement is reproduced: 
We do hereby agree to carry out and fulfill 
the terms and conditions specified above, and the 
seller agrees to furnish good and marketable 
title with a policy of title insurance in the 
name of the purchaser and to make final 
conveyance by warranty deed if either party 
fails so to do, he agrees to pay all expenses of 
enforcing this agreement, or of any right arising 
out of the breach thereof, includinq a reasonable 
attorneys fee. (Emphasis added) 
Lines 45-48 of page 1, Exhibit 2-P. 
It is clear from the pleadings and trial proceedings the' 
the Agreements. The very prayer of the Answer seeks attornevs 
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ff'P'; nnl y for "de· fending" the action (R. 25). There is no legal 
1ustif1cation for such relief. No allegation was made that 
Appellants breached the Aqreements. No affirmative relief was 
sought against Appellants. Instead of trying to enforce any part 
of the Agreements, all of Respondents' efforts were directed 
toward establishing that the Agreements had either never come into 
existence or had been replaced by another agreement. 
Respondents succeeded in influencing the trial court to 
ignore the specific terms of the attorneys fee clause and award 
attorneys fees to Respondents based upon a misguided theory of 
"reciprocity." (See Transcript re Attorney Fees at pages 3-4, 
R. 737-738). All of the cases argued by Respondents and 
apparently relied upon by the court below in support of the 
"reciprocity" theory involved attorneys fees language different 
from the clause at issue in this case and were based upon 
considerations that are totally inapplicable to the case at bar. 
Justice Stewart's dissent in Devore v. Bostrom, 632 P.2d 
832, 837 (Utah 1981), was grounded in a consumer/dealer context 
and relied on a section of the Utah Consumer Credit Code as a 
basis for attorneys' fees, not "reciprocity." Similarly, in 
United States v. Peter Kiewit & Sons Co., 235 F. Supp. 500 (D. 
Alaska 1964), the attorneys' fees issue was actually determined by 
an interpretation of the Miller Act and an Alaskan statute that 
had nothing to do with "reciprocity" or the Purchase Agreement 
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clause at issue in this case. 
75, 232 P.2d 374 (1951), attorneys fpps were rewarrlPrl pur.rt1ant 
a specific Utah statute which provided that an award of attornn· 
fees to be given in a divorce was discretionary with the 
judge. In Hackford v. Snow, 657 P. 2d 1271 (Utah 1 q82), the 
parties who were awarded attorneys fees pursuant to the Farnest 
Money Agreement were the same parties who had souqht anrl harl heen 
awarded specific performance under the Agreement, unlike the 
position of Respondents here. Indeed, none of the ahove cases ca' 
be held to support the proposition that a party may rely upon the 
terms of a contract which the party has successfully avoirled in 
order to collect attorneys fees. In fact, none of the ahove case 0 
can be used to support the concept of "reciprocity" which 
Respondents urged to the trial court. All of the cases were 
decided pursuant to specific statutory or contract language whict 
was carefully interpreted and followed by the awardina court, anrl 
distinguishable from any of the operative facts and law in the 
case at bar. If no contract existed here, no enforceahle riahtc 
existed, and hence no reciprocal rights could possibly exist. 
Moreover, any reliance by the lower court on Pesponrlent 0 ' 
attempt to establish reciprocity in the awarcl of attorneys fees a' 
a requirement of "due process" is also totally unfounclecl. 
cases cited by Pespondents on which the trial court mav have 
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rr·I 10d in support of the theory of "reciprocity/due process" 
involvPrl discussions of "fundamental interests," or discrimination 
against a "suspect classification," and no assertion of 
reciprocity as a general theory. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 
249 (1953) Postow v. Oriental Building Assoc., 455 F. Supp. 781 
(D.C. Cir. 1978). No fundamental interests or suspect 
classifications are involved in the case at bar. Any purported 
reliance on civil rights cases in support of the lower court's 
view that Respondents should receive attorneys fees does not 
justify further comment. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of January 17, 1983 awarding attorneys fees 
against Appellants must be reversed. Respondents cannot be 
allowed alternately to uphold and/or discard their prior theories 
to their best advantage. Respondents are estopped to raise in 
support of attorneys fees the contents of the Agreements which 
they proved in the trial court did not legally exist. Moreover, 
the terms of the clause relied on, even if effectively binding, do 
not entitle them to attorneys fees in this case because Respondents 
did not incur any expenses in enforcing the Purchase Agreement or 
seeking affirmative relief against Appellants, or otherwise 
sustain any defenses grounded in the terms of the Purchase 
Agreement. All Respondents' efforts were successfully expended in 
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avoiding the Purchase Agreement. hlhPth0r tl'tt' r111 Arirr: 
existed or whether it di cl nnt, a point which this l'nur t r 
have to decide, Respondents are not PntitlPcl to recover attnrn• 
fees. 
Respectfully submitted day of Mav, lg83. 1 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
I I'/:'/: ·/I' 
Don B. Allen 
'----(, 
Tara D. Anderson 
Attornevs for Appellants 
400 Deseret Builcling 
Salt Lake City, lltah 84111 1• 
31n order not to delay the appeal process this brief is 
timely filed. However, the transcript of the proceedings nf 
January 5, 1983 has not yet been prepared hv the Court Reporter 
and will subsequently he filed as a supplPment to thP record. 
Appellants reserve the right to make appropriate reference tn tr 1' 
transcript covering issues on this appeal in their reply brief, ' 
any. However, no additional points of araument on Appellants' 
case will be asserted. 
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PR IN('E, YEATES & GELDZAHI.ER 
Gordon Strachan 
Attorneys for Respondents and 
Crnc;s-Appellants 
Third Floor MONY Plaza 
424 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake rltv, Utah 84111 
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